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Clarifications are a longstanding but little-studied concept in statutory inter-
pretation. Most courts have found that clarifying amendments to preexisting
statutes bypass retroactivity limitations. Therein lies their power. Because
clarifications simply restate the law, they do not implicate the presumption
against retroactivity that Landgraf v. USI Film Products embedded in civil-
statute interpretation. The problem that courts have yet to address is how ex-
actly clarifying legislation can be distinguished from legislation that substan-
tively changes the law. What exactly is a clarification? The courts’ answers
implicate many of the entrenched debates in statutory interpretation. This
Note offers three primary contributions. First, it summarizes the existing doc-
trine of clarifications as it has been established in the federal circuits and
highlights the important implications of their approaches. Second, it argues
that clarifications are an important tool for courts and lawmaking bodies.
Third, it provides a more intelligible taxonomy for courts to use, including
specific factors that ought to guide their determination of whether an
amendment clarifies the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Actress Ashley Judd, a central figure in the #MeToo Movement,1 filed
suit against film producer Harvey Weinstein in April 2018.2 Judd alleged
that she had been repeatedly harassed by Weinstein and passed over for a
possible role in The Lord of the Ringsmovies because she refused his advanc-
es.3 In her lawsuit, Judd stated that Weinstein violated California law by
making a sexual quid pro quo within a professional relationship, offering to
help establish Judd’s Hollywood career in exchange for sex.4 A federal judge,
however, dismissed the claim on an obscure legal technicality: an amend-
ment that expressly covered Judd and Weinstein’s relationship was a sub-
stantive change to the existing law rather than a clarification.5
Judd’s argument relied on a new bill that amended California Civil Code
§ 51.9, a law that forbids harassment in certain professional relationships.6
The new bill added “[d]irector or producer” to the list of professions ex-
pressly covered by the law.7 The bill’s proponents cited concerns with har-
assment in the film industry and even named Harvey Weinstein.8 The
legislative history of the amendment stated that “this bill’s explicit mention
1. Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Person of the
Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), https://time.com/time-person-of-the-
year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/V5AM-UWPS].
2. Notice of Removal at 1, Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724 (C.D. Cal. June 28,
2018).
3. First Amended Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief at 2–3, Judd v. Wein-
stein, No. 18-CV-05724 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018).
4. Id. at 10–18, 22–24.
5. Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019)
(order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss), rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9 (West 2020) (establishing liability for injury or economic loss
if “the defendant holds himself or herself out as being able to help the plaintiff establish a busi-
ness, service, or professional relationship with the defendant or a third party” by “[making]
sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, [or] demands for sexual compliance”); The
#MeToo Laws Coming to California in 2019, CBS L.A. (Dec. 20, 2018, 6:55 PM),
https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2018/12/20/sexual-harassment-laws-california-2019/
[https://perma.cc/3G4X-LEGL].
7. CIV. § 51.9.
8. S. JUD. COMM., ANALYSIS OF S.B. 224, 2017–2018 Sess., at 4–5 (Cal. 2018) (discussing
harassment in the entertainment industry and citing coverage of the Weinstein scandal).
The Doctrine of Clarifications
of [producer–actor] relationships is almost certainly declaratory of existing
law.”9 Thus, Judd claimed, the legislature merely clarified that the law ap-
plied to cases like hers going back to its original enactment.10
Judd’s argument is grounded in a longstanding but little-studied legal
principle, the doctrine of clarifications.11 Suits over whether an amendment
clarifies or changes the law occur infrequently, but when they do, the out-
comes can carry powerful consequences. The central issue of such lawsuits is
retroactivity.12 Clarifications restate what the law has always been and are
not limited by presumptions against the retroactive application of new
laws.13 Under Judd’s argument, Weinstein could be held liable even though
the amendment was passed years after the relevant conduct.
The judge disagreed and held that the amendment changed the law. He
concluded that the 2018 California legislature was limited by the intended
scope of the original enactment and that the amendment could only apply to
producer–actor relationships going forward.14 Those harassed by Weinstein
and other Hollywood figures would have to seek relief on different
grounds.15
Clarification doctrine is an increasingly relevant, but controversial, legal
principle. With retroactivity in the balance, courts’ interpretations have de-
9. S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES OF S.B. 224, 2017–2018 Sess., at 4 (Cal.
2018) (emphasis added); see also Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion
to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2018).
10. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action
of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 15–16, Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2018).
11. For example, the American Jurisprudence article on the topic contains only two
short paragraphs and cites just seven cases. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 238, Westlaw (data-
base updated Feb. 2020).
12. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 685 (9th Cir. 2000) (explain-
ing that the central issue was whether an amendment signed into law after the lawsuit governs
the case).
13. E.g., Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999) (stat-
ing that clarifications do not implicate retroactivity limitations).
14. Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019)
(order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss) (“While the 2018 Legislature almost certainly
hoped that the prior version of § 51.9 covered harassment by producers, its statement in the
bill analysis, which under the circumstances may have been colored by wishful thinking, is en-
titled to little weight in interpreting what the statute meant when it was enacted in 1999.”),
rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020).
15. In July 2020, after most of the editing for this Note was completed, the Ninth Circuit
overruled the District Court’s decision. Judd’s claim could proceed under § 51.9. But the Ninth
Circuit reached this ruling by finding that the statute “plainly encompasse[d] Judd and Wein-
stein’s relationship, which was ‘substantially similar’ to the ‘business, service, or professional
relationship[s]’ enumerated in the statute.” Judd v. Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.
2020). The Ninth Circuit did not determine whether the original statute applied to producer-
actor relationships in general and declined to say whether the amendment clarified or modified
the law. Id. at 957 n.2.
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termined the validity of wrongful termination claims of corporate whistle-
blowers,16 allegations of discrimination against former servicemembers,17
and a suit about whether Rolling Stones songs infringed on copyright protec-
tions.18 As exemplified in Judd v. Weinstein, the central question in clarifica-
tion-doctrine cases is how to determine whether an amendment clarifies. But
that simple question hides a complex analysis that courts have yet to fully
develop. Answering it requires a two-part inquiry: First, did the enacting
body intend to clarify the existing law? And second, does the amendment
restate, rather than change, the original enactment?19 Those questions in
turn provide fertile ground for debates on statutory construction and the
proper amount of deference to legislative bodies’ interpretive rules regarding
prior enactments.
By failing to adopt a uniform analysis, courts have created difficulties for
legislative staff drafting new laws and for litigants trying to determine
whether those laws affect their interests. The courts have also muddied our
understanding of the legislature’s power to direct courts and agencies as to
how to interpret prior statutes. Clarity is in order.
This Note explores the clarification doctrine and proposes a framework
for consistent analysis of legislative amendments. Part I explains the consti-
tutional background for the doctrine and the varying applications that exist
in federal courts. Part II highlights the major issues with the doctrine, in-
cluding implications for the separation of powers and divergent approaches
on what evidence should be considered when a court decides whether an
amendment clarifies the law. Part III discusses why the doctrine is useful and
proposes a new analytical framework for clarification analysis based on how
the amendment is labeled, whether the amendment resolves or attempts to
resolve a defined ambiguity, and the amendment’s consistency with preen-
actment interpretations of prior law.
I. THEDOCTRINE OF CLARIFICATIONS
When a legislative body or agency amends a prior enactment, the
amendment serves one of two purposes. The amendment either changes the
substantive content of law or amends the previous language without actually
changing the law’s meaning. Clarifications are part of this latter category.20
They are a kind of interpretive directive, telling courts that an alteration in
the language of a statute or rule does not indicate legislative intent to change
16. See Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
17. SeeMiddleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2009).
18. See ABKCOMusic, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
19. Put another way, does the original enactment cover the behavior specified in the
amending legislation, such that the latter is merely a restatement?
20. Clarifications are sometimes referred to as “declaratory acts” because they declare
what the law is rather than change it. 1A NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 26.1, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2019).
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the law.21 Courts, as interpreters of the law, decide whether amendments are
substantive changes or clarifications to the statute;22 however, they some-
times struggle to distinguish between the two. Usually, the distinction is ap-
parent—the statutory text expressly labels the new law as a change that only
takes effect upon being signed into law or on a specified future date.23 At the
margins, however, amendments can make adjustments that seem within the
bounds of the original law.24
Section I.A. outlines the retroactivity issues implicated by the distinction
between change and clarification. Section I.B. discusses the presumption
against retroactivity and the beginnings of a doctrine of clarifications being
formed around it. Section I.C. explains the different approaches that federal
courts have taken to distinguish clarifications from substantive changes.
A quick note on vocabulary: This topic requires unusually careful usage
of certain terms, most notably forms of “clarify” and “change.” For clarity
(you see the problem), this Note generally uses “clarification” to mean a
nonsubstantive alteration to the text of the law. “Change” means a substan-
tive alteration of what the law means. This Note also aims to use “amend-
ment” as a neutral term that simply means that the text was altered, with no
implication of whether the law was changed. A second issue arises from the
fact that clarification doctrine applies to both statutes and regulations.25 For
the most part, this Note deals with clarifications generally and does not dwell
on the differences between legislatures and agencies as lawmaking bodies.
Therefore, “enacting body,” “legislature,” and “legislative body” are used in-
terchangeably to refer to both actual legislatures and agencies acting in a
lawmaking capacity.
Finally, the terms “retrospective” and “retroactive laws” can cause confu-
sion.26 In this Note, retrospective laws are simply laws that apply to a period
21. See generally Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 211, 213–15 (1994). What makes clarifications distinct from other interpretive direc-
tives is that, unlike interpretive directions that are passed contemporaneously with the law they
interpret, clarifications comment on the proper interpretation of laws enacted earlier.
22. E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
23. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823(d), 131 Stat. 2054, 2188
(2017) (amending the tax code with the amendments to take effect on the date of the passage of
the law).
24. See, e.g., Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(finding that the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s whistleblower
protections conformed with the intent behind the original law).
25. E.g., Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir. 2008).
26. Some court opinions treat the two terms synonymously, see, e.g., Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994), while others draw a distinction between retroactive
and retrospective, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Lindenthal v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 61 F.3d
1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995). The distinction drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Lindenthal is prefer-
able because even though it departs from the indistinguishable usage of the two terms in Land-
graf, it reinforces the point made in Landgraf that laws can be applied to prior events without
having “genuinely retroactive effect.” Compare id. (clarifying that retrospective laws are those
that simply apply to preenactment behavior without necessarily attaching new legal conse-
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before their enactment. Clarifications are necessarily retrospective because
they apply back to the original enactment that they clarify. Retroactive laws,
however, not only apply to preenactment events but also change the legal
consequences of those events.27 “True” clarifications, therefore, are never
retroactive because they are simply restatements of the law with no new legal
consequences. Therefore, the doctrine of clarifications could be restated as a
means of deciding whether application of an amendment is retroactive or
merely retrospective.
A. Navigating Retroactivity: Clarifications and Substantive Changes
Retroactivity concerns lurk around the often-hazy distinction between
changes and clarifications. Common law has, for good reason, historically
distrusted retroactive lawmaking.28 Constitutional limitations enshrined in
the Ex Post Facto, Takings, Due Process, and Contract Clauses reflect that
distrust.29 In the criminal context, retroactive laws vitiate the deeply held be-
lief that fair notice of the law is a prerequisite to punishment for its violation.
The Ex Post Facto Clause upholds the notions that people should be given
fair warning of the law in order to structure their actions and that the gov-
ernment should be prevented from vindictively targeting and criminalizing
past behavior.30 In civil laws—which are the main concern of this Note—
retroactive lawmaking poses similar risks, albeit with different consequences.
Retroactive laws can undermine settled expectations, expose persons and
businesses to suit for preenactment actions, and eliminate contract terms
that were acceptable at the time the contract was formed.31 The distrust of
retroactive lawmaking is reflected in the presumption against retroactivity, a
canon of interpretation that applies to all civil statutes.32
And yet retroactive laws often serve legitimate and important purpos-
es.33 A retroactive law may “respond to [an] emergenc[y], . . . correct mis-
quences), with Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273–75, 277 (describing laws that should be applied to
preenactment behavior that do not have retroactive effect).
27. Lindenthal, 61 F.3d at 1407.
28. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798); 1 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 514–15 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, &
Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826) (“A retroactive statute would partake in its character of the mischiefs
of an ex post facto law, as to all cases of crimes and penalties; and in every other case relating to
contracts or property, it would be against every sound principle.”).
29. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266.
30. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265–67; cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 15–18 (1976).
32. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (“If [an amending] statute would operate retroactively, our
traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favor-
ing such a result.”).
33. This was understood even in the early United States. E.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at
391 (“[T]here are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and
also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement . . . .”).
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takes [in the earlier law], [or] prevent circumvention of a new statute in the
interval immediately preceding its passage.”34 Recognizing these salutary
purposes, legislative bodies can generally make civil laws retroactive by giv-
ing a clear statement of intent.35 Such a statement shows a court that the leg-
islature has considered the implications of such a law and “determined that
the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfair-
ness.”36
Enter clarifications, which, as restatements of the law, bypass this analy-
sis entirely. That is what makes them powerful—and perhaps dangerous.
Clarifying amendments can decide pending cases and capture preenactment
behavior without undergoing the constitutional scrutiny reserved for chang-
es to the law.37 They can overrule previously decided cases by overturning a
court’s prior interpretation of the law.38 Such amendments are common not
just in federal law but in state law and regulations as well.39 Because clarifica-
tions are understood as mere restatements of what the law has always been,
they are not retroactive. The law, after all, has not actually changed—it has
merely been reworded to better reflect what it already meant. Nevertheless,
the application of clarifications can seem retroactive where it disposes of
pending cases or leads to changes in government policies or practices.40 And
where a clarifying amendment overrules the prevailing interpretation in a
jurisdiction, it does effect a change in the law in that jurisdiction.41
But clarifications also serve highly beneficial purposes. Clarifying
amendments are a helpful tool in the lawmaking toolbox. With significant
34. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267–68.
35. Id. at 268.
36. Id.
37. E.g., Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999).
38. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a
clarifying amendment overturned the Ninth Circuit’s prior interpretation of the law). Note
that such amendments cannot overturn Supreme Court rulings. DeVargas v. Mason & Hang-
er-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1388 (10th Cir. 1990).
39. See, e.g., Ray v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 727 S.E.2d 675, 681 (N.C. 2012) (clarification
doctrine applied to state law); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir. 2008)
(clarification of a regulation).
40. See ABKCO Music, Inc., 217 F.3d at 689 (clarifying amendment effectively overruled
case decided prior to the clarification).
41. Id. at 691 (stating that it was “literally true” that a clarifying amendment that over-
ruled a prior holding “change[d] the law in the Ninth Circuit” even though it was “a statement
of what [the law] meant all along” (quoting Beverly Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d
1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1997))). This is a paradox created by our constitutional structure. Laws
convey instructions that courts, as agents of the legislature, are meant to follow. See John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001). There-
fore, if a court misinterprets those instructions, it does not change the law’s substantive content
but rather alters its intended application. In Section III.A, this Note argues that clarifications
are valuable given the dialogic model between courts and legislatures.
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polarization and a regularly divided government leading to gridlock,42 clari-
fications could potentially give legislatures an unobtrusive and less politically
fraught means to preserve the continuity of the law and simplify its interpre-
tation by courts and agencies.43 Governments also limit liability for takings
or contract-impairment claims if they can alter a law’s language without
changing its substance.44 Clarifications simulate a dialogue between lawmak-
ing bodies and courts in which the former help direct the latter to the proper
meaning of the law. This reflects a cooperative, interbranch model of law-
making that supports the democratic legitimacy of the tripartite system of
government.45
For instance, in 2011, Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Wa-
ter Act “to clarify” the payments federal agencies had to make to use munici-
pal water systems.46 The bill added two criteria used to define “reasonable
service charges” that federal entities were required to pay.47 As a result, two
cities in Washington sought unpaid fees from a federal agency, claiming that,
as a clarification, the 2011 amendment applied to withheld payments from
prior years.48
The amendment in question neither mentioned retroactivity nor back-
dated the payments. Congress did not provide any effective date. Instead, the
plaintiffs’ argument hinged on Congress’s use of the phrase “to clarify” in the
bill’s subtitle.49 According to the plaintiffs, the government was liable for
back payments because the Clean Water Act always required the federal
government to pay reasonable service charges.50 The court agreed. The new
criteria simply clarified the intent of the original law.51
42. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 330–32 (2011).
43. Gridlock leads to more ambiguities, errors, and opportunities to exploit poor draft-
ing to accomplish political ends, Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unortho-
dox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1829–30 (2015),
augmenting the importance of legislative tools that can resolve those ambiguities. But gridlock
can also incentivize strategic usage of clarifying legislation. See id. at 1828 (stating that the pre-
sumption against retroactivity may incentivize finding faster ways to regulate).
44. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 190–91 (1992). For a more
comprehensive explanation, see infra notes 176–177 and accompanying text.
45. See James J. Brudney & Ethan J. Leib, Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch Dia-
logue”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 346, 390–92 (2019).
46. Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-378, 124 Stat. 4128; United States v. City of Ren-
ton, No. C11-1156JLR, 2012 WL 1903429, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2012).
47. Act of Jan. 4, 2011. The preexisting statute stated that every federal government divi-
sion “shall be subject to, and comply with . . . the payment of reasonable service charges.”
However, until the passage of the amendment at issue in Renton, “reasonable service charges”
had not been defined. Renton, 2012 WL 1903429, at *1 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012)).
48. Renton, 2012 WL 1903429, at *2–3.
49. See id. at *6.
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. at *8.
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The word “clarify” has significant power and, at the extreme, can func-
tion as an end run around constitutional retroactivity restrictions. Yet in
spite of the ubiquity and power of clarifying amendments, “ ‘there is no
bright-line test’ for determining whether an amendment clarifies existing
law.”52
B. Liquilux, Landgraf, and the Beginning of Clarification Doctrine
The struggle to distinguish between substantive changes and clarifica-
tions is not new. Courts have been analyzing clarifying amendments for dec-
ades.53 As doctrines governing retroactive civil laws proliferated, a doctrine
of clarifications began to take shape.
The first move toward creating a modern doctrine of clarifications at the
federal level came in the early 1990s. In Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas
Sales, a federal district court dismissed a Puerto Rican gas wholesaler’s suit
against a Texas oil corporation for lack of jurisdiction.54 The Puerto Rican
antitrust statute under which the suit was brought gave original jurisdiction
over a “gas enterprise” to the Public Service Commission (PSC).55 While the
lawsuit was pending, the Puerto Rican legislature amended the statute to fur-
ther define “gas enterprise” as “refineries, import companies, [and] distribu-
tion-wholesale companies.”56 The law as amended would have clearly given
the PSC exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
The question in Liquilux was whether the alteration, which had no effec-
tive date, indicated a substantive change in the law such that the prior law
did not give the PSC jurisdiction.57 The First Circuit went in a new direction:
the change in language was a clarification, “effective ab initio.”58 The amend-
ed language simply restated what the law had always been.
Approximately two years later, the Supreme Court addressed retroac-
tivity in the context of changes to existing law in Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
52. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting
Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506 (3d Cir. 2008)).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83, 88 (7th Cir. 1987); Lee v. Bd. of Educ.,
434 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1980).
54. Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 888–89 (1st Cir. 1992).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 889 (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 27, § 1002 (1986)).
57. Id. at 889–90. Interestingly, this argument is the opposite of Ashley Judd’s argument
in Judd v. Weinstein. Judd argued that the addition of movie producers evidenced an intent to
clarify that such professions were always covered by the harassment statute. Judd v. Weinstein,
No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019), rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.
2020). See also United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 885 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[The legisla-
ture] may, however, ‘amend a statute to clarify existing law, to correct a misinterpretation, or to
overrule wrongly decided cases. Thus, an amendment to a statute does not necessarily indicate
that the unamended statute meant the opposite.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Hawkins v.
United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1994))).
58. Liquilux, 979 F.2d at 890 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)).
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ucts.59 In Landgraf, the Court held that a presumption against retroactive
application was embedded in the interpretation of all civil laws.60 The pre-
sumption does not block all retroactive legislation, and the Court even stated
that such laws often serve “benign and legitimate purposes” including “cor-
rect[ing] mistakes.”61
Landgraf laid out three steps for analyzing a potentially retroactive stat-
ute. First, the court looks for an express statement of the law’s temporal
reach—generally an effective date.62 If there is no such statement, the court
then asks “whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., wheth-
er it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions
already completed.”63 If the court finds no retroactive effect, the law can be
applied to preenactment events and the analysis ends.64 But if the court finds
a retroactive effect, it looks for a clear statement of retroactive intent.65 A
clear statement authorizing retroactivity governs because it assures the court
“that [the enacting body] itself has affirmatively considered the potential un-
fairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable
price to pay for the countervailing benefits.”66 Absent that assurance, the law
can only apply prospectively.
But not all laws that can be applied to preenactment behavior are retro-
active. To determine if the presumption against retroactivity applies, “the
court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences
to events completed before its enactment . . . [by evaluating] the nature and
extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the op-
eration of the new rule and a relevant past event.”67
Before Landgraf, a court could apply an amendment retroactively based
on the mere label of “clarification.” Such a label (or other indicia of clarifying
intent) was potentially enough to make the law retroactive even if an
amendment attached new legal consequences. In Liquilux for example, the
First Circuit suggested that this analytical move was one of the options be-
59. 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
60. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286; see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
208 (1988) (“[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to
have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.”).
61. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268. Notably, there are types of laws that are exempted from
Landgraf’s clear-statement-of-intent requirement. See id. at 273–75 (mentioning changes to
prospective relief, jurisdiction, and procedural rules as examples of amending legislation that
should often be applied retroactively even if the enacting body did not so specify).
62. See Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 280).
63. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
64. See id.
65. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d at 1188 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
66. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272–73. Accord INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001).
67. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269–70.
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fore them.68 After Landgraf, however, clarifications needed to bypass the
presumption against retroactive statutes on post-Landgraf terms.69 A mere
intent to clarify by the subsequent enacting body could not satisfy Landgraf’s
requirement of a clear statement of intent.70
Despite predating Landgraf, Liquilux offered a solution that has been
replicated by many courts: clarifications are simply effective ab initio as re-
statements of the law that do not attach any new legal consequences. This
reasoning proliferated and, as a result, much of the modern law in the federal
circuits has its origin in Liquilux.71 Thus, clarifications became excluded
from the strong presumption against retroactive application of civil statutes
set forth in Landgraf.72
C. The Clarification Doctrine in Federal Courts
Several courts of appeals have encountered the clarifications issue.
While all except the Federal Circuit have held that clarifications bypass the
Landgraf analysis, there is no consistent test among the circuits for distin-
guishing clarifications from substantive changes. Instead, several threads of
analysis have emerged. While these tests share substantial similarities, subtle
but important differences that influence the courts’ decisions remain.
In Liquilux, the First Circuit laid out multiple factors to distinguish
clarifications from changes in the law: whether the amendment (1) fits with-
in the existing language of the statute; (2) “clarifies an ambiguity” and, if so,
“follows fast upon the ambiguity’s discovery”; and (3) affirms a prior inter-
pretation.73 Despite being a pre-Landgraf case, the Liquilux analysis remains
good law in the First Circuit.74
The First Circuit’s approach is most notable for its use of two of the fac-
tors: the promptness of the amendment and the existence of a preexisting
68. See Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating
that one option would be holding that “[t]he amendment was an alteration [of the law], but
was intended to be, and could be, retroactive in effect”).
69. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 280.
70. But see Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (arguing that repeated use of the word “ ‘clarifica-
tion’ . . . is clear, unambiguous, and commanding evidence in favor of retrospectivity”).
71. Liquilux was cited in many of the important cases discussed. See infra Section I.C. In
addition to still being law in the First Circuit, it influenced the development of clarifications in
the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. See Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp.,
323 F.3d 55, 71 (1st Cir. 2003); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 506–07 (3d Cir.
2008); Brown v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2004); Middleton v. City of Chicago,
578 F.3d 655, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2009); Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272,
1283–84 (11th Cir. 1999).
72. See, e.g., Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing
clarifications as a separate line of analysis that does not implicate Landgraf).
73. 979 F.2d at 890.
74. See United States ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D.
Mass. 2011).
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interpretation that the amendment affirms. The first criterion helps ensure
that the legislature meant to clarify the prior law. If the amendment follows
fast upon the discovery of an ambiguity, it is more likely that the legislative
body wanted to weigh in before settled expectations built around erroneous
interpretations. The second criterion assures the court that the amendment
accurately restates the prior law. If the “clarification” affirms an interpreta-
tion already rendered by a court or agency, then it seems more likely to be a
fair restatement of the original law and poses less risk of unfairness.
The Ninth Circuit created its own clarification doctrine in Beverly
Community Hospital Association v. Belsh that was refined in ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. LaVere.75 Cases in the Ninth Circuit have generally looked for (1) lan-
guage in the amendment that expressed an intent to clarify the law;76 (2) leg-
islative history that indicated the subsequent legislature’s intent to clarify;77
and (3) an ambiguity in the law that the amendment helped resolve.78 Unlike
the approaches taken by the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit’s approach em-
phasizes subsequent legislative history to decide whether to uphold the
amendment as a clarification. While subsequent legislative history can pro-
vide guidance to answer the primary inquiry of whether the second enacting
body intended to clarify, it is “a hazardous basis for inferring” that the subse-
quent enactment merely restates the preenactment law.79
The most broadly cited approach to the clarifications problem was de-
veloped by the Eleventh Circuit in Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines,
which has been adopted in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits as well.80 The
Piamba court identified several relevant factors, including (1) whether there
was a preexisting ambiguity or conflicting interpretations among the courts;
(2) whether there was a declaration of the subsequent enacting body’s intent
to clarify; and (3) whether the legislative history of the amendment is con-
sistent with the prior law and its legislative history.81 Subsequent courts have
hewed closely to the three factors outlined by Piamba, often treating them as
75. Beverly Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because
Congress thus has such authority to change the law as to pending cases, its power to clarify the
law—to confirm what the law has always meant—follows a fortiori.”); ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 689–91 (9th Cir. 2000).
76. See Beverly, 132 F.3d at 1265–66.
77. See ABKCO, 217 F.3d at 690–91.
78. See Beverly, 132 F.3d at 1265–66; see also Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170,
1185–87 (9th Cir. 2016) (following the doctrinal steps set forth in Beverly and ABKCO).
79. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117–18
(1980) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). While this remains the mode
of analysis in the Ninth Circuit, the court seems to be more guarded about its use in recent cas-
es. See Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d at 1186–87.
80. 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1999). The doctrinal analysis stemming from Piamba has
been used in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in addition to the Eleventh. See Brown v.
Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 259–61 (4th Cir. 2004); Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655,
663–65 (7th Cir. 2009). It was also followed in an influential district court case in the Second
Circuit. See Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 589–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
81. Piamba, 177 F.3d at 1283–84.
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effectively comprising a three-factor test.82 The Eleventh Circuit’s most valu-
able contribution was in expressly requiring a comparison of the amend-
ment’s legislative history with the prior law’s text and legislative history.
Debates about legislative history aside, the Piamba approach reflects particu-
lar care in ensuring that the purported clarification is “consistent with a rea-
sonable interpretation of the prior enactment.”83
The Third Circuit took a different approach in Levy v. Sterling Holding
Co., outlining four factors that are particularly important for determining
whether an amendment clarifies or changes:
(1) whether the text of the old regulation was ambiguous, (2) whether the
new regulation resolved, or at least attempted to resolve, that ambiguity, (3)
whether the new regulation’s resolution of the ambiguity is consistent with
the text of the old regulation, and (4) whether the new regulation’s resolu-
tion of the ambiguity is consistent with the agency’s prior treatment of the
issue.84
The Third Circuit was interpreting a regulation in Levy, but its analysis
has been applied to statutes.85 The court distinguished its own analysis not
on the statute–regulation distinction but rather on its judgment that titles
and responsiveness to court precedent were not very significant.86 This dif-
fers significantly from the approaches taken by the other circuits. The Third
Circuit did not explain why it considers titles to be less illuminating. While
titles are often considered to be of limited use,87 they are particularly helpful
in clarification doctrine as a means of determining whether the subsequent
legislature really intended to clarify the preexisting law.
The significant outlier among the courts of appeals is the Federal Cir-
cuit, which has no separate doctrine of clarifications and insists that all
amending legislation must be analyzed under Landgraf.88 In rejecting clarifi-
cations, the Federal Circuit described the binary of clarifications versus
changes as “unhelpful.”89 It stated that the categorical exercise “provides lit-
tle insight into whether a retroactive effect would result in a particular
82. See, e.g., Leshinsky, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
83. Piamba, 177 F.3d at 1284.
84. Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 507 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
85. See United States v. Meehan, 798 F. App’x 739, 741 (3d Cir. 2020); Leshinsky, 873 F.
Supp. 2d at 590.
86. See Levy, 544 F.3d at 507 (“[W]e note that there are two other factors on which some
courts of appeals rely that we do not find to be all that significant.”).
87. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–
29 (1947).
88. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We
find the binary analysis—change or clarification—advanced by the government largely unhelp-
ful.”). The D.C. Circuit seems to recognize clarifications as a separate category that does not
implicate retroactivity restrictions, but the D.C. Circuit’s analysis is hard to distinguish from
Landgraf given its examination of “settled expectations.” See Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.
Leavitt, 531 F.3d 844, 846–49 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
89. Id.
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case. . . . [A] clarification, in fact, ‘changes the legal landscape,’ because ‘a
precise interpretation is not the same as a range of possible interpreta-
tions.’ ”90
The concern of the Federal Circuit seems to be that clarifications, even if
appearing benign, will nevertheless affect the preamendment choices of
good-faith actors attempting to interpret the law. By narrowing to a precise
interpretation, the enacting body captures preamendment behavior that may
have been based on a reasonable interpretation of the prior language. The
value of this approach is that it maximizes fair notice and minimizes the dis-
ruption of settled expectations.91 And by minimizing legislatures’ authority
to issue interpretive directives to courts, the Federal Circuit’s approach up-
holds a rigid separation of powers.92
II. COMPLEXITIES ANDCHALLENGES IN CLARIFICATIONDOCTRINE
Clarifications raise a number of questions, but two issues loom particu-
larly large. The first issue is the separation of powers between courts and leg-
islative bodies. Courts say what the law means. But clarifications potentially
allow legislative bodies to encroach on that authority. Clarifications also pre-
sent a means by which a subsequent body can surreptitiously change the
meaning of the prior law without running into retroactivity problems. If
judges are “faithful agents,” to which legislature should they be faithful?93
Section II.A explains this issue further, looking at how functionalist and
formalist lenses enable or limit the use of clarifications.
The second issue is interpretation—which is to say, what evidence ought
to be used to distinguish clarifications from changes? The various approach-
es in the courts of appeals respond to this issue. But different philosophies in
statutory interpretation mean that the validity and utility of certain factors
are up for debate. Moving toward any sort of consistent approach requires
wrestling with the implications of textualist or intentionalist thinking. Since
clarifications require interpretation across two laws, the original enactment
and the purported clarification, those divides are exacerbated. Section II.B
addresses this issue.
90. Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala,
23 F.3d 412, 423–24 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
91. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
92. See generally Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legisla-
ture? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 867–70
(2009) (defining a statutory directive as an instruction from the legislature to judges about how
to interpret a statute).
93. SeeManning, supra note 41, at 5 (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed
that federal judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”).
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A. Functionalist and Formalist Approaches to Clarifications
Agencies, courts, and subsequent legislatures are always involved in an
interpretive exercise, mapping their own understandings and intentions on-
to the words of prior legislatures. One issue that clarification doctrine raises
is whether subsequent legislative bodies should play a role in interpreting
prior enactments and, if so, how far that deference should extend.94 Agen-
cies, for instance, have been given substantial deference in interpreting their
own regulations.95 Although that deference does not permit agencies to
trample Landgraf protections,96 it raises the question of how much courts
should trust the enacting body’s declaration of the meaning of the original
enactment.
When a court declares that an amendment clarifies a prior law, that
court effectively ratifies the current legislature’s understanding of a past leg-
islature’s enactment. When a court declares that an amendment changes a
prior law despite the current legislature’s intention to only clarify, that court
is elevating its own understanding of the prior enactment above the under-
standing of the current legislature. In either instance, the court is forced to
resolve the problem by deciding whose interpretation deserves greater defer-
ence: its own or that of the current legislature.97
This issue implicates the classic divide between formal and functionalist
approaches to law. Formalists and functionalists disagree about how strictly
courts should police the lines between the separate branches of government.
Functionalists allow for greater overlap in the roles that the three branches
play, emphasizing “the need to maintain pragmatic flexibility” in modern
government; formalists attempt to strictly separate the branches in the exer-
94. Compare Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117
(1980) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent
of an earlier one.” (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))), with Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380–81, 381 n.8 (1969) (“Subsequent legislation declaring the
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.”). See also W.
Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 933 P.2d 507, 514 (Cal. 1997) (“Ultimately, the
interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power . . . . Indeed, there is little logic
and some incongruity in the notion that one Legislature may speak authoritatively on the in-
tent of an earlier Legislature’s enactment when a gulf of decades separates the two bodies.”).
95. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
96. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–56 (2012); Bowen
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988). But see Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Au-
er deference encourages agencies to be vague, “so as to retain a ‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clar-
ification’ with retroactive effect”).
97. For example, where long-standing interpretations by courts and agencies differ from
the legislative amendment, those interpretations may be given greater deference than the legis-
lature insofar as what qualifies as clarifying. See Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170,
1186–87 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Post-hoc labeling as a ‘clarification’ by bill supporters of what oth-
erwise appears to be a change . . . is not controlling given the long interpretive history of the
statute.”).
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cise of their core functions.98 The separation of powers is a potent issue hid-
ing within clarifications because clarifications direct the court toward a par-
ticular interpretation even though interpreting the law is a core function of
the courts.99
A functionalist approach to the doctrine of clarifications gives more lati-
tude to the later legislature by giving greater deference to its interpretive di-
rectives.100 It assumes that because interpretation influences the substance of
the law, legislative bodies must retain some power to address interpretive is-
sues as a means of protecting the law’s substance.101 By allowing later legisla-
tive bodies to clarify previous enactments, the functionalist approach would
give greater leeway to the interpretive directives of the legislature. A formal-
ist approach, in contrast, would significantly diminish or reject the subse-
quent legislature’s power to clarify. Since interpretive directives encroach on
the courts’ core function, a strictly formalist approach would not accept a
lawmaking body’s efforts to direct judicial outcomes.102 While the formalist
approach would not dispense with clarifications entirely—a court, in theory,
could still find that the amendment restates the law without considering
what the subsequent legislature thinks or intends—it would eliminate the
subsequent legislature’s prerogative to “declare” the meaning of the prior
law.
A functionalist approach has the substantial advantage of allowing legis-
latures to adapt statutory language to contemporary circumstances without
running afoul of Landgraf. Ashley Judd argued for this approach.103 When
the original California legislature referred to “professional relationships,” it
may well have meant to include a relationship between an actress and a mov-
ie producer who guides her career and enables her access to opportunities.104
The original law defined professional relationships as “including, but not
limited to” a list of twenty examples.105 The legislative report summarized
the subsequent amendment as “almost certainly declaratory of existing
98. See Jellum, supra note 92, at 854–55.
99. Id. at 881 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see id. at
840–41.
100. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11–12 (1994)
(“Because it is hard to enact statutes, the ones that are enacted have to last a long time. As they
encounter unanticipated circumstances, the statutes are bound to change. . . . The sequential
and hierarchical structure of statutory interpretation means . . . that the expectations of the cur-
rent legislature might be more important than those of the enacting one.” (emphasis added)).
101. Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and Separation of Powers, 2 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 28 (1999).
102. Jellum, supra note 92, at 890–92.
103. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
104. The Ninth Circuit eventually overruled the District Court and held that the pre-
amendment law covered Judd andWeistein’s relationship because it was “substantially similar”
to the examples given in the statute. But the court stopped short of holding that producer-actor
relationships were covered in general. See Judd v. Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2020).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9(a)(1) (West 2000) (amended 2019).
The Doctrine of Clarifications
law.”106 The complexities of drafting and the natural shortcomings of human
foresight likely meant that the original legislature did not realize that such
relationships would be excluded from the law, despite the intent to include
them. Preventing the amendment of a later legislature from applying retro-
spectively would impose the impossible task of being perfectly clear on the
prior legislature.107
This approach has intuitive appeal because it seems to acknowledge the
human limitations of legislators and reflect the realities of human communi-
cation, where literal words must shift to accommodate context without alter-
ing their fundamental meaning. A functionalist approach to clarifications
could help legislatures respond to rapidly changing culture (and language)
while preserving the continuity of the law.108 Consider, for example, the clar-
ification at issue in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere.109 The Ninth Circuit had
previously created a circuit split and contradicted the prevailing interpreta-
tion of a provision in the Copyright Act in La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ
Top.110 After La Cienega, Congress amended the statute to effectively over-
rule the interpretation adopted by the Ninth Circuit.111 Assume that the later
Congress’s interpretation of the statute was correct. Then, in overruling the
Ninth Circuit’s holding via clarification, Congress preserved the meaning of
the law without creating a disjunctive gap between the pre-La Cienega law
and the post-clarification law.112 Allowing subsequent legislatures to clarify
endows them with a tool to protect the law’s substantive meaning in an un-
predictable interpretive conversation with courts.113
However, there are issues with the functionalist approach. Landgraf rec-
ognized that retroactive legislation has a “potential for disruption or unfair-
ness.”114 Deference to interpretive directives from legislative bodies already
encroaches on the courts’ function as interpreters. And greater deference to
106. S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES OF S.B. 224, 2017–2018 Sess., at 4 (Cal.
2018).
107. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24,
2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-
originalism [https://perma.cc/7TBT-5AAB] (“Ignoring the limitations of foresight . . . the tex-
tual originalist demands that the legislature think through myriad hypothetical scenarios and
provide for all of them explicitly rather than rely on courts to be sensible.”).
108. See Jellum, supra note 92, at 881–82 (“When the legislature defines (or even rede-
fines) a term, the legislature’s act is ‘part of the ongoing dialogue between [the] legislature and
court over the original legislation’s meaning.’ ” (quoting William D. Araiza, The Trouble with
Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory
Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1999))).
109. 217 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. ABKCO Music, 217 F.3d at 688–90 (describing the circuit split created by La Cienega
Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995)).
111. Id. at 690.
112. See id. at 691.
113. See Brudney & Leib, supra note 45, at 391.
114. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994).
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the subsequent enacting body’s declared meaning entails a greater risk of un-
fairness. Deference does not seem so problematic when the enactments may
be separated by a session or two, but when the original enactment and
amendment are separated by several years or even decades, courts are right
to become more suspicious of the ability to clarify.115 If the legislature chang-
es the law under the guise of a clarification, such an action would go against
the retroactivity principle found throughout the common law.116 If we as-
sume that the prior legislature did not intend the subsequent clarification,
then the functionalist approach privileges the subsequent legislature and its
“clarification” over the prior legislature and its original law.
The advantages of a functionalist approach to interpreting clarifications
may not seem worth the risks, especially since legislators have another path-
way to retroactivity beyond the clarification doctrine.117 As a result, some
prefer a formalist approach.118 In practice, a court employing the formalist
approach would look suspiciously at the legislative body’s efforts to influence
its interpretive prerogative. A formalist approach presumes that the prior
legislature was able to convey what it meant in the original text and resolves
ambiguities against a purported clarification.119 Such an approach has two
significant benefits: it closely guards the interpretive function of the courts
and maximizes fair notice for regulated persons, at least among courts that
accept clarification doctrine.
Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels provides an example of the formalist ap-
proach. At issue in Tarsadia Hotels was an amendment stating in its title that
the law sought “to clarify how the [earlier law] applies to condominiums.”120
Multiple supporters of the bill stated that the amendment was meant to clari-
fy the scope of the original enactment.121 Despite the title and legislative his-
tory indicating that the amendment was a clarification, the Ninth Circuit
rejected that interpretation: “Post-hoc labeling as a ‘clarification’ by bill sup-
porters of what otherwise appears to be a change . . . is not controlling given
115. See Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2019) (“[T]he views of the 2018 Legislature on the meaning of a statute enacted in 1999 are
surely entitled to . . . less weight.”), rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020).
116. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270; see also Araiza, supra note 108, at 1064 (“[The inter-
pretive quality of declaratory statutes] is especially pronounced in the case of redefinitions,
which have the effect of altering the reach of the statute without purporting to change its sub-
stance.”).
117. Under Landgraf a statute can be made retroactive through an “express command”
by the legislature. 511 U.S. at 280.
118. See Romero, supra note 21, at 223.
119. For an example of what a formalist approach might look like, see Beaver v. Tarsadia
Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the amendment changed, rather
than clarified, the law, despite being described as a clarification by individual members of Con-
gress and using the word “clarify” in the bill title).
120. Id. at 1187.
121. Id. at 1186–87.
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the long interpretive history of the statute.”122 Tarsadia Hotels does not rep-
resent a strictly formalist approach to clarifications because the court did not
wholly disregard the subsequent enactment but simply said that its label and
legislative history were insufficient to overcome other factors suggesting a
change in the law. Even so, the case does provide an example of a court re-
sisting the subsequent legislature’s authority to dictate the court’s interpreta-
tion.
By rejecting the ability of subsequent legislative bodies to have a voice in
the interpretive process, a strict formalist doctrine of clarifications demands
that legislatures get it right on the first try. A formalist approach would im-
pose an unrealistic standard of clarity in the original enactment. It would al-
so put a substantial burden on enacting bodies to quickly enact a law
expressly covering a novel set of circumstances or overrule an unfavorable
interpretation in order to preserve legal continuity.123 Statutes are frequently,
if not always, the result of compromises and last-minute negotiations that
can complicate the text ultimately adopted.124 The nature of legislating, espe-
cially at the national level, turns on so many political compromises that it
often crawls at a snail’s pace, preventing a legislature from overruling a judi-
cial or administrative decision before others follow suit.125
Clarifications should be seen as “the two branches work[ing] in partner-
ship to accomplish the legislative agenda,” rather than an encroachment on
core judicial functions, acknowledging the inherent impossibility in being
perfectly clear on the first try.126 Courts should still impose guardrails, but
those guardrails should not impose rigidity on democratic institutions that
require flexibility to engage in a meaningful conversation with the courts.127
B. Clarifying the Interpretive Problems
The second major issue presented by clarification doctrine is what evi-
dence ought to be used to decide whether the amendment restates the prior
law. Clarifications bypass Landgraf analysis because they do not attach any
new legal consequences to prior events.128 To distinguish between an
122. Id.
123. Cf. Bell, supra note 101, at 18–20.
124. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pt. 1), 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 934 (2013) (discussing how the political interests involved in crafting legis-
lation can lead to redundancy and the inclusion of specific phrases desired by interest groups).
125. See Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (de-
scribing conflicting ALJ decisions interpreting Sarbanes-Oxley text over several years prior to
the clarification).
126. Jellum, supra note 92, at 882.
127. See infra Section III.B.
128. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994) (holding that to de-
termine if the presumption against retroactivity applies, “the court must ask whether the new
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment”); Beverly
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amendment that changes the law and one that clarifies requires asking first if
the legislature intended for the amendment to merely clarify the law,129 and
second if the amendment functions as a restatement of the prior law.130 To
make matters worse, two laws are involved in the analysis: the original stat-
ute and the new amendment. Answering the second question requires inter-
preting the original enactment and discerning its relationship to the later
amendment.131 In other words, clarifications require the court to conduct
two statutory analyses simultaneously.
The first question asks whether the subsequent legislature was trying to
clarify the existing law. Because all statutory-interpretation cases are filtered
through the arguments of self-interested litigants, the court needs objective
criteria to decide whether the amendment was even meant to clarify the ear-
lier statute. The second, and harder, question goes to substance. An amend-
ment may announce itself clearly as a clarification even though it
substantively changes the law—a change in sheep’s clothing.132 But even
when an amendment significantly alters the original language, the alteration
does not necessarily indicate that the amendment changes the law.133 Thus
courts need objective criteria to answer the second question as well. The di-
versity of approaches makes that challenging.
For example, consider the longstanding debate over legislative intent.
Not only is legislative intent often used in clarification doctrine, but it is also
expressly part of the analysis in cases decided in the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits.134 Legislative history can be very helpful to answering
the preliminary question of whether the enacting body truly meant to clari-
Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Princess Cruises, Inc.
v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declining to recognize distinction be-
tween clarifications and changes regarding retroactivity).
129. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpre-
tation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as
to give effect to the intent of Congress.”).
130. Cf. Araiza, supra note 108, at 1064 (suggesting that statutes that redefine terms
should relate back to the passage of the original enactment “[i]f such interpretive acts reflect
plausible readings of the original statute”).
131. See Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592–601 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(attempting to establish legislative intent of both the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the original intent of Sarbanes-Oxley itself).
132. See Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In determining whether a
rule is a clarification or a change in the law, the intent and interpretation of the [enacting
body] . . . is certainly given great weight. They are not, however, dispositive. If they were, an
[enacting body] could make a substantive change merely by referring to a new interpretation as
a ‘clarification.’ ”), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.
1999).
133. Brown v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Piamba Cortes v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999)).
134. See supra Section I.C.
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fy.135 But even the usage of legislative history in this context may be fraught
absent other text-based corroborating evidence. Legislative intent is a legal
fiction;136 legislative bodies comprising dozens if not hundreds of members
“will lack collective intent on any question worth worrying about.”137 Even
where the legislative history seems to indicate that the legislature intended to
clarify the law, danger lurks where that intent is not reflected in the text it-
self. Courts that put great weight on legislative history may find themselves
not only ignored by textualist judges138 but also duped by crafty legislators.
The problem with a purely text-based approach, however, is that clarifi-
cation doctrine exists because laws are not always easily intelligible. The
plain text of a statute cannot always reveal the intent of the enacting body.139
And if the words on the page are the only way to infer legislative intent,140
then definitively establishing the meaning of particularly vague statutory text
becomes particularly challenging.141 Courts regularly come to different in-
terpretations of the same statute, including when conducting clarification
analysis, undermining the notion that courts can simply look to the text to
determine the enacting body’s intent to clarify.142 To illustrate the problem of
interpretation, this Note will discuss three indicia of intent to clarify—
legislative history, titles, and response to changing circumstances.
For example, multiple courts reached different outcomes when inter-
preting a Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) amendment to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX) for exactly this reason. SOX protected whistleblowers reporting fraud
to the federal government from retaliation by their employers.143 The DFA
amendment clarified that those protections extended to employees within
wholly owned subsidiaries of companies that were regulated by SOX.144
There was one serious hurdle: the amendment was not labeled as a clarifica-
135. See, e.g., Leshinsky, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (noting the terms “make clear” and “clari-
fication” in the Senate report accompanying the purported clarification).
136. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 124, at 915.
137. John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1912 (2015).
138. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYANA. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 397 (2012).
139. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 531–32 (2015).
140. See SCALIA &GARNER, supra note 138.
141. See, e.g., Beverly Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 1997).
142. See Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 531 F.3d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We
believe the pre-Act law was not as clear as the Ninth Circuit thought it to be.”); Messenger v.
Rice, No. CV-05-0053, 2006 WL 276933, at *7 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2006) (finding the Eleventh
Circuit’s interpretation of the same statute to be “aberrational” without giving reasoning).
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 806, § 1514A, 116 Stat. 745,
802–04 (2002).
144. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 929A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1852 (2010) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1514A to expressly cover the em-
ployees of “any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information is included in the consoli-
dated financial statements of such company”).
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tion.145 In Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., a federal district court undertook
an extensive analysis of the legislative histories and purposes of both bills be-
fore concluding that the DFA amendment clarified SOX and could be ap-
plied to pre-DFA situations.146 Another court came to the opposite
conclusion inMart v. Gozdecki, Del Giudice, Americus & Farkas LLP, repeat-
edly criticizing the Leshinsky court for its failure to undertake a “plain lan-
guage” analysis of DFA.147 According to the Mart court, because the
amendment did not explicitly label itself a clarification, the Leshinsky court
could hardly hold it as such.148
And yet titles themselves are controversial. The same courts that look to
legislative history also generally look to the title of the amending section as
an important indication of intent to clarify.149 For the courts following the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Piamba, a declaration of intent to clarify pro-
vides substantial evidence that the subsequent legislative body intended the
amendment as a clarification rather than a change.150 This factor may help
determine the first question—whether the legislature intended to clarify the
existing law.
The Ninth Circuit goes beyond that, however, by implying that the sub-
sequent legislature’s label can affect the interpretation of the prior law.151
Thus, the Ninth Circuit seems to allow declarations by the subsequent legis-
lature to inform the second, substantive question. The Ninth Circuit is will-
ing to defer to the legislature’s interpretation of the original statute given
“the extraordinary difficulty that the courts have found in divining the intent
of the original [legislature].”152
While the Ninth Circuit gives great weight to the title of an amendment,
the Third Circuit’s approach expressly devalues titles or captions as mean-
ingful indications of the enacting body’s intent to clarify.153 The court may
be concerned that labeling a substantive change in the law as a clarification
145. Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
146. Id. at 591–601.
147. Mart v. Gozdecki, Del Giudice, Americus & Farkas LLP, 910 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095
(N.D. Ill. 2012).
148. Id. at 1094.
149. See, e.g., Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 838 (4th Cir. 2013); Brown v.
Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 2004).
150. Brown, 374 F.3d at 259.
151. See Beverly Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997) (“It has
been established law since nearly the beginning of the republic . . . that congressional legisla-
tion that thus expresses the intent of an earlier statute must be accorded great weight.” (citing
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381–82, 381 n.8 (1969))). But see notes 120–122 and
accompanying text. Tarsadia Hotels does not seem to reject the proposition that the subse-
quent legislature’s views are entitled to deference but rather bases its decision on other factors.
See 816 F.3d 1170, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2016).
152. Beverly, 132 F.3d at 1266.
153. Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 507 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1998)).
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could be a sneaky end run around Landgraf that results in retroactive appli-
cation of new law.154 Courts are concerned that the meaning of the original
law might be subverted by the alleged clarification of a subsequent legisla-
ture.155 By approaching the subsequent legislature’s labels with skepticism,
the court protects the law from unprincipled actions by the later legislature.
This problem can be avoided by ensuring that the amendment “must al-
so comport with other attributes of ‘clarifying’ legislation to avoid being a
substantive change in the law.”156 While the Third Circuit is right to be cau-
tious in putting great weight on the labeling of the amendment, the already-
challenging problems posed by clarifications makes it unwise to wholly dis-
pense with a given piece of objective evidence.
Courts also take different approaches to amendments that clearly re-
spond to new events. S.B. 242 explicitly responded to sexual harassment and
assault scandals in Hollywood, and the court in Judd v. Weinstein assumed
that this meant that the law was likely changed.157 Additionally, both the
amendments in question in Tarsadia Hotels and Leshinsky responded to the
2008 financial crisis.158 But, in Tarsadia Hotels, the Ninth Circuit viewed the
amendment with suspicion, inferring that altering the law’s language in re-
sponse to new circumstances indicated that the law was changed while being
labeled “post hoc” as a clarification.159 On the other hand, the Leshinsky
court drew no such inference. The Leshinsky court found that the fact that
DFA responded to remarkably similar circumstances as the original enact-
ment in SOX weighed in favor of the amendment being clarifying.160 Courts
worry that certain political environments pressure the legislature into cap-
turing preenactment behavior without arousing political or legal scrutiny
that would accompany an expressly retroactive law. The response is that
clarifying legislation is not changing the law to fit new situations but rather
adapting the language to explicitly handle interpretive ambiguities brought
to light by contemporary events. But even this response reveals the need for
rules and guidance to break the circularity.
154. Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that if the stated intent of
the later enacting body were given dispositive weight, it “could make a substantive change
merely by referring to a new interpretation as a ‘clarification’ ”), overruled on other grounds by
Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1999).
155. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980).
156. Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2009). Accord Baldwin v.
City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 838 (4th Cir. 2013).
157. Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2019), rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020).
158. See Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016); Leshinsky v. Tel-
vent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank
Act, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-
frank-wall-street-reform [https://perma.cc/WN69-625U].
159. 816 F.3d at 1186–87.
160. Leshinsky, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 591–601.
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Clarifications analysis, as it has developed, still lacks clear principles and
objective indicators that would serve legislators, agencies, and judges.161 We
need a better doctrine.
III. TOWARD ACONSISTENTDOCTRINE OF CLARIFICATIONS
Given these challenges, why allow clarifying amendments at all? And if
we do have a doctrine of clarifications, what should it look like? Section III.A
discusses the purpose of the clarification doctrine and argues that it is a use-
ful tool for legislative bodies. Section III.B argues for specific criteria to be
used by courts in making the distinction, namely, a declaration of intent, an
identifiable ambiguity in the original law, and consideration of the effect on
prior interpretations.
A. The Purpose of Clarification Doctrine
Clarification doctrine poses risks to settled expectations and the separa-
tion of powers. The Federal Circuit manages without clarifications, at least as
an exclusion to Landgraf.162 And, since enacting bodies have the power to
make laws retroactive under Landgraf by including a clear statement of in-
tent, it’s not obvious that clarifications should allow a second bite at the ret-
roactivity apple. So why is the doctrine worth it?
In declining to recognize a doctrine of clarifications at all, the Federal
Circuit reasoned that clarifying amendments always lead to new legal conse-
quences simply by limiting the range of possible interpretations.163 By nar-
rowing meaning to a “precise interpretation,” the enacting body captures
preamendment behavior that may have been based on a reasonable interpre-
tation of the prior language.164 Therefore, rejecting the clarification doctrine
maximizes fair notice and minimizes the disruption of settled expecta-
tions.165 It would also uphold a rigid separation of powers, supporting a for-
malist approach by limiting the legislature’s encroachment.
And yet, the Federal Circuit is wrong. Clarifications should not always
go through the Landgraf analysis to be given their proper scope. Such an ap-
proach equates an individual’s personal interpretation of the law with an es-
tablished (but erroneous, in the eyes of the legislature) interpretation of a
161. Lisa Schulz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pt. 2), 66 STAN. L. REV.
725, 774–75 (2014) (finding that a majority of congressional staffers would change drafting
practices to conform to court interpretive canons if those canons were applied consistently).
162. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
163. Id. (quoting Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423–24 (D.C. Cir.
1994)).
164. Id.
165. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012).
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court or agency.166 Courts and agencies have authority to interpret and cre-
ate law, and clarification doctrine must account for disruption where a clari-
fying amendment would “literally” change the law in a jurisdiction. To
gesture at such protection for individuals’ “range[s] of possible interpreta-
tions,” however, is a step too far.167
The Constitution already provides void-for-vagueness protections where
laws are unintelligible.168 Protections rarely exist for individuals’ mere bad
interpretations of the law.169 Reading and understanding law is always an in-
terpretive exercise and an exercise that entails risks. Landgraf’s retroactivity
limitations are about the law itself, not protecting individuals’ variant prior
interpretations of the law.170 The Supreme Court in Landgraf wanted to pre-
vent legislative bodies from changing the law without expressing a firm in-
tent to do so.171 The Court’s concern was rooted in “settled expectations”172
and “vested rights.”173 No one has a vested right to an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the law, even if made in good faith.
Requiring every amendatory act to go through the Landgraf analysis
would be a solution worse than the problem it addresses. Such a requirement
would do three things. First, the requirement would impose on subsequent
legislatures any interpretations of the law that, if declared erroneous, might
“change[] the legal landscape.”174 The inquiry would shift from what the law
always was to what the law has since been taken to mean by good-faith ac-
tors. Consideration of private actors’ reliance on their own interpretations
would have the effect of “locking in” a particular interpretation of the law
and incentivizing private actors to use the courts rather than the political
166. Where “erroneous” interpretations are grounded in rulings from courts or adminis-
trative rules, however, the purported clarification should be treated with less deference. See
Section III.B.
167. Princess Cruises, 397 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23
F.3d 412, 423–24 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
168. Void-for-vagueness doctrine tends to be more lenient in the construction of civil
statutes than criminal. Its protections still apply, however. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. The
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497–99 (1982).
169. See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411–12 (1833) (“Mistakes in the
construction of the law, seem as little intended to be excepted . . . as accidents in the construc-
tion of the law.”); see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S.
573, 582 n.5 (2010).
170. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269–70 (1994) (“A statute does not
operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it . . . upsets expectations based in prior law.” (citation
omitted)).
171. See id. at 280.
172. Id. at 270.
173. Id. at 268–69 (quoting Soc’y for the Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas.
756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)).
174. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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process to impose their preferred meaning.175 It would be one thing for a
court to say that California’s sexual harassment law did not apply to Harvey
Weinstein. It would be another to accept Weinstein’s interpretation as limit-
ing the legislature.
Second, a broad Landgraf requirement could have the perverse effect of
suggesting that the law was, in fact, changed. exposing the government to
more lawsuits alleging Takings, Due Process, or Contract Clause violations.
When a law or regulation diminishes the use or value of private property, the
government may be liable to compensate the owner for the reduced value
under regulatory-takings jurisprudence.176 Similarly, if a law impairs preex-
isting rights or duties, the government may be enjoined from enforcing that
law.177 If the amendment merely clarifies, however, then it does not cause ei-
ther a diminution in property value or an impairment of contract rights.
That value, right, or obligation never existed to begin with. The problem is
that courts are not sure what to infer from an amended law. In Weinstein v.
Judd, the court stated that the amendment may itself be evidence that the
meaning of the law had been altered.178 But other courts warn against this
inference.179 Running every purported clarification through Landgraf analy-
sis would lead courts to assume that the act of amending signals an intention
to change the law, further increasing the likelihood that legislative bodies
will be locked in by private actors’ interpretations of the law. A desire to
175. Cf. Jon Connolly, Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible
Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 173–74 (2001) (describing a similar dynamic
in the agency law context).
176. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325–
26 (2002). Two factors may combine to make regulatory-takings claims at the federal level par-
ticularly burdensome going forward. The first is the indefinite nature of the regulatory-takings
test. See Danaya C. Wright, A Requiem for Regulatory Takings: Reclaiming Eminent Domain for
Constitutional Property Claims, 49 ENV’T L. LEWIS & CLARK L. SCH. 307, 317–18 (2019) (de-
scribing the “shifting sands on which regulatory takings doctrine rests”). The second, recent
development is the elimination of the state-remedy exhaustion requirement to pursue a takings
claim in federal court. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019). These two as-
pects of takings jurisprudence will lead to a proliferation of complex, protracted takings litiga-
tion in federal courts in the coming years, raising the stakes for clarifying legislation.
177. The Contract Clause prevents the impairment of contractual rights or duties by state
law. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 249–50 (1978). Amend-
ments that clarify the criteria for a law’s applicability would be particularly easy targets for such
claims. Cf. supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. The Due Process Clause lacks bite in this
context because Landgraf made clear that retroactive lawmaking is constitutionally permissi-
ble. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,
30–31 (1994) (stating that retroactive economic regulations need only have a rational basis to
survive due process analysis). Therefore the Due Process Clause is more of a theoretical limita-
tion on retroactivity than a functional one.
178. No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019) (“[T]he fact that
the Legislature found it necessary to amend the statute . . . is evidence that it may have had
some doubts as to whether these relationships were covered by existing law.”), rev’d, 967 F.3d
952 (9th Cir. 2020).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 885 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997); Callejas
v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 1984).
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avoid litigation (and possible compensation) would disincentivize minor but
otherwise valuable clarifying amendments, undercutting the value in retro-
spective lawmaking.
Finally, requiring every clarifying act to satisfy Landsgraf would be a sig-
nificant burden to place on legislators and already-lengthy bills. At the ex-
treme, legislatures, wary of the possibility that even their rote textual
amendments could be interpreted as causing a retroactive “effect,” would be
incentivized to add express statements of retroactive intent throughout the
bill.180 Most clarifying amendments make mundane changes to the law that
are unlikely to ever be litigated.181
The arguments in favor of a clarification doctrine are more compelling.
The most fundamental is that we want clear laws. Since the legislature is the
body responsible for the law’s substance, clarifications preserve continuity in
the law’s substantive meaning while accepting the fallibility of courts as in-
terpreters.182 Clarifications allow legislative bodies and courts to mutually
refine legal texts so that laws more successfully communicate their substan-
tive content.183 Circuit splits, for example, can also upset settled expectations
and prevent fair notice where a party that travels or does business across
multiple jurisdictions is subject to divergent interpretations of the same
law.184 By clarifying the law’s meaning, Congress can improve notice and set-
tle expectations by providing uniformity.
Moreover, clarifying amendments better reflect actual human commu-
nication. To better express their ideas in speech and writing, people edit, re-
vise, add specific examples, or eliminate confusing words. Revisions that
seem to conveniently change the original statement are often viewed with
suspicion.185 Clarification doctrine transposes this common human dynamic
onto the highly complex field of debating and drafting legislation and trusts
courts to be able to tell the difference.
Legislatures also have a significant foresight problem. Legislators cannot
safely predict how a law will be interpreted or ensure that those interpreta-
180. Some bills already do this as a failsafe, making their clarifying amendments comply
with Landgraf. See, e.g., S. 1703, 116th Cong. § 206(c) (2019).
181. See, e.g., John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 913, 132 Stat. 1636, 1923 (2018) (amending “military strategic and oper-
ational risks” in 10 U.S.C. § 153(b)(1)(d)(iii) to “military risk”).
182. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
183. See Brudney & Leib, supra note 45, at 391.
184. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 855–56 (1994).
185. See, e.g., Quinta Jurecic & Benjamin Wittes, What’s So Hard to Understand About
What Trump Has Said?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas
/archive/2020/04/trump-contains-multitudes/610300/ [https://perma.cc/A3S8-JY77]; Timothy




tions will hew closely to the law’s intended meaning.186 Recognizing a clarifi-
cation doctrine in the courts ultimately empowers the legislature to answer
the range of interpretations that a law may inspire without creating a “new”
law with each revision. Courts have long extended laws to applications that
may not have been anticipated at the time.187 Clarification doctrine gives the
legislature a means to weigh in on extensions or contractions in the applica-
tion of existing law without causing a break in the continuity of the law’s
substantive meaning. This function of clarifications is particularly important
at the federal level where only the Supreme Court and Congress can defini-
tively resolve interpretive divides among the fifty states and thirteen cir-
cuits.188 Given the resource constraints of a nine-member body presiding
over more than 300 million people, the Supreme Court is not well situated to
decide every interpretive question that arises out of federal law.
Finally, clarification doctrine already addresses fair-notice concerns. In
each of its forms, the current doctrine has guardrails to limit the enacting
body’s amendment to the scope of the original law.189 The distinction be-
tween a clarification and a change, in a vacuum, is unhelpful and conclusory.
But the point of the doctrine is not “[m]erely categorizing rules or applica-
tions of rules” but deciding what the law was and whether the legislature has
changed it.190 Since only changes implicate Landgraf, to subject every
amendment to Landgraf analysis is to apply the wrong tool. The tests pro-
posed by other circuits have given guidance on how to navigate the ambigui-
ty. However, clarification doctrine does have a consistency problem. The
next Section provides factors that can fulfill the doctrine’s goals while also
curbing its significant risks.
B. Clarifying the Doctrine of Clarifications
Statutory interpretation is sometimes thought of as a conversation be-
tween legislatures and courts.191 Courts interpret laws passed by legislatures
according to directions given by the legislature.192 When necessary, the legis-
lature can correct or endorse the courts’ interpretations through further leg-
186. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[W]e must realize that [the
words of the law] have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.”).
187. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998) (ex-
tending Title VII protections to same-sex harassment despite it not being “the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII”).
188. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1991).
189. See supra Section I.C.
190. Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 397 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
191. See generally Brudney & Leib, supra note 45.
192. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982).
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islation.193 Clarification doctrine has an important role to play within this
conversation, allowing legislatures to maintain a law’s continuity while rising
to meet new circumstances or overrule errant judicial decisions.194 Legisla-
tures should have the power to clarify the law because such a power allows
them to support the interpretive exercise conducted by courts.195 If legal
meanings were always clear, there would be no need for courts’ interpretive
powers. Clarifying legislation reflects the fallibility of human communica-
tion, which consistently calls for greater specificity, nuance, or context in or-
der to discern meaning.196
Courts play the role of watchdog. Courts, like skeptical interlocutors,
help recognize purported clarifications that actually aim to shift the law or
impose new meanings on old acts.197 They help defend settled expectations
and guard the intent of prior legislatures, forcing new language to fit within
the preexisting meaning of the law. But another important role of the courts
is setting the ground rules for the conversation.
The best approach would start from the two basic questions hiding in
clarification doctrine. Courts need objective indicators to help them decide
whether an amendment is meant to clarify and, subsequently, whether that
amendment merely restates or substantively changes the prior law. The first
question—whether the subsequent legislature intended to clarify—must be
answered in the affirmative before even examining the substance of the two
laws. If the enacting body did not clearly signal its intent to clarify the law,
then a litigant should not be able to impose the amendment on the preen-
actment text just because it seems to be reasonably consistent with the prior
meaning. But even if the subsequent legislature seemingly did intend to clari-
fy, the second inquiry—whether the amendment restates, rather than chang-
es, the original enactment—remains unanswered. Rather, an independent
analysis must be undertaken to prevent strategic usage of clarifications to
avoid retroactivity restrictions.
193. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the clarification overruled the prior interpretation in La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top,
53 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1995)).
194. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 650–51 (1990).
195. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV.
269, 281–82 (2019) (“[C]ourts need to understand and respect the limited capacity of the legis-
lature to ‘speak’ clearly and determinately while seeking to realize an ideal of governmental
legitimacy that has important, but not exclusive, democratic wellsprings.”); Jellum, supra note
92, at 882.
196. See, e.g., The Editors, The Best of Lowercase, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 31,
2019), https://www.cjr.org/the_lower_case/best-of-lowercase-2019.php [https://perma.cc
/EM58-EZK7].
197. See, e.g., Judd v. Weinstein, No. 18-CV-05724, 2019 WL 926343, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
9, 2019) (“But . . . the views of the 2018 Legislature on the meaning of a statute enacted in 1999
are surely entitled to even less weight. Statutory interpretation is the province of the judiciary,
not the legislature.”), rev’d, 967 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2020); Brudney & Leib, supra note 45, at
356–57.
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First, courts should examine the title and subtitle of the amendment to
determine whether the subsequent enactment was meant to clarify. This fac-
tor not only helps answer the first part of the clarification inquiry but also
helps the court screen litigants’ arguments. Where the enacting body has not
labeled an amendment as a clarification, the litigant so claiming should bear
a much higher burden of proof the rest of the way. Legislative history may be
consulted, as necessary, but the history should be so consistent as to indicate
that the lack of a label was a drafting error.198 Such a requirement also sets a
clear norm for legislatures that mirrors the “clear statement” rule in Land-
graf.199 And even if the amendment has been clearly labeled as a clarification,
this should not be sufficient to end the inquiry.
Second, the court should seek to locate an ambiguity in the original en-
actment that the amendment resolves or attempts to resolve. The language of
the original enactment must reasonably apply to the behavior explicitly cap-
tured by the subsequent amendment. Doing so will help ensure that, as a
substantive matter, the amendment simply restates the preexisting law. Un-
clear laws also result in fewer settled expectations, so efforts to clarify such
ambiguities are not likely to result in unfairness.200
Finally, the court should examine preamendment judicial interpreta-
tions, if any exist. The more consistent the amendment is with those inter-
pretations, the more likely that the amendment is a mere restatement of the
law. If a long series of decisions interpreted the law differently than the pur-
ported clarification, the court should be much more wary of treating the
amendment as clarifying. The hard cases occur when the previous interpre-
tations are mixed. In that situation, courts should defer to the legislature, as-
suming that the amendment is accurately labeled as clarifying and attempts
to resolve an identifiable ambiguity. Though this inevitably allows some leg-
islative encroachment, the safeguards provided by the other two factors
should sufficiently protect considerations of fairness. A certain amount of
deference acknowledges the significant constraints on legislatures, especially
their limited ability to anticipate judicial interpretations.201 Clarification doc-
trine protects not only continuity in the law but also its functionality.
These three factors—clear labeling, ambiguity resolved by the amend-
ment, and consistency with prior interpretations if they exist—are factors
used by the current approaches, though not universally so.202 The Third Cir-
cuit’s rejection of labels, for instance, eliminates a crucial piece of evidence
198. The lack of a label should not be dispositive but should require a fairly rigorous
analysis showing that the legislature understood that it was clarifying the law. For an example
of what this would look like, see Leshinsky v. Telvent GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591–601
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
199. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994).
200. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules—Interpretive, Legislative, and Retroac-
tive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 953–54 (1948).
201. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Section I.C.
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for deciding whether the enacting body intended to clarify the law.203 Alter-
natively, the Ninth Circuit’s approach puts too much emphasis on the sub-
sequent amendment and legislative intent behind it, creating a risk that
courts will allow the subsequent legislature’s intent to impose retroactive ef-
fect without complying with Landgraf’s clear statement requirement.204
Other factors should not be heavily considered in the analysis. For ex-
ample, the promptness with which a legislature responds to an adverse court
interpretation may seem helpful in establishing the subsequent legislature’s
intent, but it takes for granted the legislature’s ability to be constantly aware
of court interpretations and move quickly to counter them.205 Whether an
amendment upholds a prior interpretation also represents a shaky basis for
inferring that the amendment clarifies.206 While courts should be suspicious
of a purported clarification that runs contrary to a long line of decisions,
clarifications frequently overrule court interpretations. Fewer preexisting
court interpretations means fewer settled expectations built around them,
which should give legislative bodies more flexibility to clarify whether or not
they choose to adopt what a court has already said.
This three-factor test, therefore, strikes a balance between, on the one
hand, preserving flexibility and allowing participation in the interpretive dia-
logue between courts and legislatures and, on the other hand, protecting set-
tled expectations and fair notice. By using factors that are already being
considered by the federal circuits, the test could be uniformly adopted with-
out greatly disrupting the existing judicial approaches.
Judicial uniformity creates predictable norms for legislatures. Legislators
are aware of some of the interpretive canons used by courts and draft laws
accordingly.207 Under a consistent doctrine, members of the legislature, an-
ticipating how courts will evaluate their amendments, will be able to better
signal their intent and express why they think the amendment is an accurate
203. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
204. Some courts have drawn this inference. See, e.g., Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control
v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that re-
peated use of the word “clarification” is “clear, unambiguous, and commanding evidence in
favor of retrospectivity”). Legislatures sometimes label an amendment as a “clarification” but
provide a prospective effective date, further undermining the label as a sufficient indicator of
retroactive intent under Landgraf. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 2303(c)–(d), 124 Stat. 119, 296 (2010).
The situation is different when an amendment both is labeled as a “clarification” and con-
tains an express statement of retroactive effect, perhaps through a retrospective effective date.
See, e.g., S. 1703, 116th Cong. § 206 (2019). In such an instance, the amendment already passes
the Landgraf test, making a deeper clarification analysis beside the point. See supra notes 62–66
and accompanying text.
205. Contra Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887, 890 (1st Cir. 1992)
(finding significant whether a clarifying amendment “follows fast upon the ambiguity’s discov-
ery”).
206. Contra id.
207. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 124, at 928–29.
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restatement of the existing law.208 Under the current doctrine, legislators and
other lawmakers have to adjust their drafting to express intended statutory
meaning to courts that have different methods of interpretation. This is a
particular problem for Congress, which makes laws that must anticipate the
variant modes of analysis in thirteen federal appellate circuits.
A consistent doctrine would also help courts by making it easier to ad-
judicate litigants’ claims. When courts interpret statutes or regulations, they
are usually weighing the merits of the litigants’ interpretations. The conver-
sation between legislatures and courts necessarily runs through litigants as
intermediaries. If a consistent doctrine leads to more normalized drafting
practices by legislatures—through clearer labeling of clarifications, for in-
stance—then judges will be able to evaluate cases more expeditiously and
private actors will be able to more easily interpret the law as it applies to
them. The clarification doctrine currently suffers from a lack of clarity. By
moving toward a consistent set of factors, courts can help fix that.
CONCLUSION
This Note has clarified209 a little-studied but important emerging doc-
trine. Courts have not given legislatures and litigants consistent guidance on
how to draft laws or interpret an amendment’s applicability. The courts
themselves suffer from a lack of doctrinal clarity, failing to cogently explain
and apply the doctrinal analysis involved in clarifications. The adoption of
the multifactor test proposed here would help ameliorate this problem.
Despite the wonky and ostensibly dry nature of interpreting amend-
ments to legislation, there are real winners and losers in these statutory in-
terpretation battles. Retroactivity only increases the stakes. Courts fulfill an
important purpose in setting the rules for how we read and understand the
applicability of statutes and regulations. Courts should provide something
currently missing in this emerging doctrine: clarity.
208. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 161, 774–75.
209. My editors made me do it, I swear.
